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NO. 2 JANUARY 2020 Introduction 
The Widening Military–political Gap 
in Israel 
Former Chiefs of Staff Fight for Principles of Statism 
Yoram Peri 
Over the last decade, the gap between the military and political elites in Israel has 
increased and eventually peaked in 2019, when a group of senior officers who had 
just retired from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) formed a new party – led by three 
former chiefs of staff – and called for the replacement of Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s government. This gap has developed because Israel’s previous govern-
ments have represented a new kind of polarising, right-wing politics beyond what is 
considered a shared national common sense. The military, on the other hand, is striv-
ing to maintain the character it has acquired as a “Nation in Arms” by reflecting the 
entire society of Israel and acting according to its professional ethos and national 
statist values. The stated goal of the officers entering politics was to defend those 
values against perceivably partisan and polarising governmental politics. The com-
position of a future government is thus both: A competition over principled values 
of the state, but also a determination about the steps regarding the military and 
political leadership in Israel, as well as the military’s relations with society at large. 
 
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with 
free elections and a multiparty system that 
leads to coalition governments, and the 
principle of military subordination to the 
political echelon has been anchored in the 
Basic Law: The Military (1976). As a result, 
the nature of Israel’s military–government 
relations has been obscured, and most 
observers do not fully appreciate the actual 
weight that the military wields in determin-
ing Israeli policies. 
Even though Israel practices the “instru-
mentalist model”, meaning that the military 
executes policies set by the government, 
another model coexists, namely that of 
“political–military partnership”, as the 
military has been a weighty partner in 
determining government policies even 
beyond the narrow field of security. 
What has enabled the IDF to maintain 
its image as a national and non-political 
institution is the fact that it views itself 
as a professional body acting out of non-
partisan considerations. Even the perma-
nent professional military – and not only 
the conscripted units – continues to be a 
“citizens’ army” that reflects all shades of 
civilian society. Thus, the ethos of the IDF 
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is not one of militaristic professionalism. 
Rather, it represents very strongly the 
Israeli idea of “Mamlachtiyut” – a statist 
national ethos that combines notions of 
belonging to the same community, due 
conduct, inclusivity, and engaging for the 
common good of Israel. 
Soldiers and officers come from all walks 
of life and represent the broad spectrum of 
political views prevailing in Israeli society. 
Yet, the leadership of the IDF was always 
a product of the political mainstream and 
never came from the more extreme margins 
of society, neither right nor left – embody-
ing the very idea of Mamlachtiyut. 
Although differences between the mili-
tary and the political echelons have always 
occurred, we have seen a new quality of 
discrepancies between the IDF and its civil-
ian superiors during the Netanyahu years. 
This is linked mainly to the fact that the 
policies of the respective Netanyahu gov-
ernments in recent years have shifted Israel 
far to the right, and that the government 
disputes positions which have been guiding 
state policies and institutions for a long time. 
This shift created a new political battle-
field, especially with the “gatekeepers” of 
the principles of statism, such as the police, 
the judiciary, and especially the Supreme 
Court – but also the military. Concerning 
the IDF, this discrepancy sees two mutually 
reinforcing levels: What is professionally 
feasible from a military point of view, and 
what is politically feasible with regard to 
what is best for the State of Israel. 
Politicisation of Military Actions 
One of the central political messages the 
right-wing governments tried to establish 
was that, at best, the political left does not 
understand security, or in the worst case, 
that they are helping Israel’s enemies. 
In addition, there has been a competition 
among right-wing groups about who is more 
“authentically” right-wing. That has set in 
motion a dynamic of radicalisation, which 
led the respective parties to present ever 
more hard-line security positions, such as 
toppling the Hamas regime and achieving 
a “decisive victory” against Hizbullah. In 
other words, advocating a tough militaristic 
stance towards Israel’s adversaries was, in 
recent years, a political strategy by which 
the political right hoped to gain votes with-
in the right-wing electorate. 
This created a strong politicisation of 
military actions and goals. As a result, it 
produced a growing dichotomy between 
positions the government was taking and 
evaluations of the IDF’s general staff. 
A series of events that took place in the 
last decade illustrates this gap between the 
government and the IDF leadership. 
One of the latest and most remarkable 
events took place a few days before the Sep-
tember elections in 2019, when security lead-
ers prevented Netanyahu from declaring 
the annexation of the West Bank and even 
stopped a major military operation in Gaza. 
Another prominent example is when the 
heads of the defence establishment opposed 
an attack on Iran proposed by the political 
leaders. In 2010, the heads of the security 
establishment – Chief of Staff General Gabi 
Ashkenazi and Mossad chief Meir Dagan – 
literally prevented an attack on Iran’s nu-
clear facilities as instructed by the prime 
minister and defence minister. These public 
servants went so far as to claim that such a 
directive – in the absence of the approval 
of the entire cabinet – would be unconsti-
tutional. This situation repeated itself in 
2011 and 2012 under Chief of Staff Benny 
Gantz and Mossad chief Tamir Pardo. 
Another example is the different posi-
tioning of prominent ministers and poli-
ticians within the government and the IDF 
regarding policies vis-à-vis Hamas in Gaza, 
especially since 2015. In response to Hamas’s 
missile and rocket attacks on Israeli civil-
ians, Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman, 
supported by other cabinet ministers, de-
manded a massive military campaign that 
was intended to lead to a full takeover of 
the Gaza Strip by the IDF’s field units, the 
surrender of Hamas’s military forces, and 
the collapse of the Hamas regime. Similarly, 
in 2019, Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz 
called for a re-conquering of Gaza to “defeat 
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Hamas”. The military objected to those ideas, 
not only because it would result in many cas-
ualties – both to the IDF and to the civilian 
Palestinian population – but also because 
there was no permanent military solution 
for Gaza, as it had stressed time and again. 
There are many more examples in recent 
years where – while right-wing politicians 
have called for a show of force – the army 
has called for moderation, emphasised the 
importance of diplomacy to restrain Palestin-
ian violence, and, most recently at the be-
ginning of 2020, called for work permits in 
order establish calm between Gaza and Israel. 
Growing Distance between the 
Army and the Government 
The government’s policies in the security 
field have led to harsh responses by mili-
tary leaders. The latter fear losing the two 
pillars that have earned them a special 
status: Their strong position in dialogues 
with the government could be undermined, 
and they could also lose the confidence of 
large segments of the public, who might 
fear that the military will cease to be a non-
political citizens’ army. What has support-
ed these perceptions is that the national 
religious movement (the engine behind the 
settlements project) has managed to infil-
trate the centres of power in Israeli society 
– including the military – to a degree that 
far exceeds their relative representation 
within the population at large. 
The IDF leadership is very concerned 
about the widening gap between the mili-
tary and civilian society, so much so that, in 
the past decade, a number of chiefs of staff 
have declared that this rift poses a serious 
danger to the IDF, even more than the mili-
tary threats of terror organisations or from 
Iran. 
Officers Parachute into Politics 
The feeling that government officials and 
the military top brass do not broadcast on 
the same wavelength has led the latter to 
organise politically and to participate in the 
April 2019 elections. Therefore, a substan-
tial number of retired, very high-ranking 
officers joined ranks in order to defeat the 
government of Prime Minister Netanyahu. 
No wonder that the newly formed party 
Kahol Lavan (“Blue and White”) – with 
Benny Gantz, Gabi Ashkenazi, and Moshe 
Ya’alon, three former IDF chiefs of staff – 
was called “the party of the generals”. 
As these officers had already left the army 
and became civilians, their involvement in 
the political game was legitimate; however, 
they reflected and represented the positions 
of their former colleagues in uniform. 
Senior retired officers have participated 
in the highest ranks of government since 
the early days of the State of Israel. They 
benefit from the high public esteem for the 
military, with a current trust rate among 
Jewish Israelis of about 90 per cent, where-
as the level of trust in political parties has 
fallen to 14 per cent. In the public percep-
tion, politicians are perceived as acting out 
of narrow personal motives and in the ser-
vice of particular interest groups, whereas 
military officers are valued patriots who are 
acting for the sake of the nation, willing to 
risk their lives. 
Yet, the country has never seen three for-
mer chiefs of staff in one party. They entered 
politics not only to work on the political–
military relationship, but, as they continue 
to stress, to preserve the statist principles 
by which the state is governed. Thus, politi-
cal–military relations are a core issue, but 
the party is presenting – or at least claims 
to present – their understanding of IDF 
values as a political guideline per se. Their 
core demands are to uphold the rule of 
law, end corruption, strengthen republican 
values, end partisan governments, create 
a national-unity coalition, and uphold prin-
ciples of good governance. 
They contrast it with the politics of Netan-
yahu’s governments, which they deem sec-
tarian, partisan, and focussed on religious 
and ethno-nationalist principles, rather 
than being orientated towards the pro-
fessional and common good. Kahol Lavan 
party leader Benny Gantz described that 
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difference with the catch phrase that he 
would stand for a “Memshala Mamlachtit” 
(statist government), whereas Netanyahu 
would head a “Memshala Malchutit”, meaning 
Netanyahu would govern Israel like a king-
dom. 
In those formulations, the shift that 
Israel has taken over the last years becomes 
visible. Whereas the principles of statism 
were previously widely shared among 
politicians, they have now become a bone 
of contention: As the Israeli Democracy 
Index in 2018 has shown, questions sur-
rounding the principles of statism, the rule 
of law, and the state of Israel’s democracy 
became, for the first time in its history, a 
major dividing line between left and right 
– and thus formed a new (and currently 
dominant) political cleavage in Israel. This 
is emphasised by the strong showing of the 
“party of the generals”, Kahol Lavan, in the 
two elections of 2019. With 35 and 33 seats 
(out of 120), respectively, they headed the 
strongest or second-strongest faction in the 
Knesset. In both elections, the newly 
formed party was clearly identified as the 
major competitor to Netanyahu’s Likud, 
thus indicating a shift in the political 
landscape of Israel. 
Scenarios for Future Political–
military Relations 
The heightened involvement of retired 
officers in electoral politics in 2019 has 
already had a negative effect on political–
military relations. Representatives of the 
right wing have attacked not only the 
retired-officers-turned-politicians, but also 
the military establishment itself. The IDF 
has been accused of being fearful of enter-
ing into battle, of not believing in the like-
lihood of reaching a victory in the battle 
with Hamas or Hizbullah, of refraining 
from carrying out a vigorous and aggressive 
policy against the Palestinians, of nurturing 
defeatist tendencies, and of being infected 
with “leftism”. 
Not a few representatives of this right-
wing political circle have publicly recom-
mended that a new nationalist government 
should initiate an overhaul of the IDF com-
mand, remove the upper echelon, and pro-
mote a young cadre of commanders. These 
would certainly be primarily composed of 
dedicated religious officers who were edu-
cated in the religious pre-military colleges 
and the national religious schools. 
Such blatant identification between the 
IDF and one wing of the political map – 
together with the explicit call for political 
cleansing of the military leadership – was 
previously unheard of in Israel. Despite 
sharp differences between left and right, 
until now, all parties have always been 
careful to keep the military out of the po-
litical fray. In the second decade of the 21st 
century, the IDF has found itself at the cen-
tre of a national debate. 
If the current trend of dominance of 
ethno-nationalist and religious politics 
continues, it is likely that we will see ever-
growing criticism of the government against 
the IDF elite, as long as they do not comply 
with the government’s view on security-
related matters. It needs to be seen to what 
extent they can withstand the pressure. In 
any case, the likelihood of the preference for 
military solutions over political approaches 
in conflict scenarios will certainly rise. 
On the other hand, a government that is 
not made up of purely right-wing parties 
will probably break these dynamics of self-
radicalisation of the right wing’s political 
demands. Especially if Kahol Lavan, the 
“party of the generals”, were to be in a gov-
erning coalition, the gap between the mili-
tary and political leadership will be signifi-
cantly smaller. Thus, much depends on the 
composition of the next government. 
Yoram Peri, PhD, is Jack Kay Professor of Israel Studies and Director at the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies. He was 
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